



SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT; SOUTH SOUTH REGION; RIVERS STATE.

Prepared for: NCDC / Nigeria CoPREP.

**OPERATING IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD**

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CoPREP	COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GoN	Government of Nigeria
NCDC	Nigeria Center for Disease Control
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
SMF	Security Management Framework
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VAC	Vaccination Approval Criteria
WB	World Bank
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
ESN	Eastern Security Network
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CMT	Crisis Management Team
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
MEDI VAC	Medical Evacuation
DSS	Department of State Services
LGA	Local Government Area
OCG	Organized Criminal Groups
ROE	Rules of Engagement
NDM	Niger Delta Militant
ISWAP	Islamic State of West Africa Province
IVCP	Illegal Vehicle Check Point
PBIED	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
PDP	People's Democratic Party
APC	All Progressive Congress

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The scope of this Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is specific to Rivers State, Nigeria. This assessment and report were produced in January 2022. Risk scenarios were identified, and a vulnerability analysis was conducted relative to project personnel activity. A series of mitigation measures were identified for each to reduce personnel risk to as low as practical. The recommended mitigation measures are included in this report and should provide the basis for security plans for activity in the city.

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1. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION.

Rivers state shares internal borders with Imo, Abia, and Anambra states in the north, Akwa Ibom state in the east and Bayelsa and Delta states in the west. The state's capital is Port-Harcourt.

Rivers state is composed of the following 23 Local Government Areas (LGAs): Abua–Odual, Ahoada East, Ahoada West, Akuku-Toru, Andoni, Asari-Toru, Bonny, Degema, Eleme, Emohua, Etche, Gokana, Ikwerre, Khana, Obio-Akpor, Ogba–Egbema–Ndoni, Ogu–Bolo, Okrika, Omuma, Opobo–Nkoro, Oyigbo, Port Harcourt and Tai.

In the 2006 census, the population of Rivers state was 5,198,16. Based on this census, the population was estimated at 7,303,924 in 2016. There are numerous ethnic groups in Rivers state, including the Ikwerre, Ibani, Opobo, Eleme, Okrika, and Kalabari, Etche, Ogba, Ogoni and Engenni.

Rivers State has been a major hub of oil and gas activities in Nigeria since the '50s and its people have, for many years, been highly enmeshed in a crisis of violence. This crisis started as agitations emanating from the years of neglect of the area by the Nigerian state and multinational oil firms. In spite of the oil wealth the state generated, little of the money was seen to be reinvested. The violence has been manifested in frequent kidnapping, election related violence, cult violence, armed robbery, inter communal and intra communal conflicts, giving the state a reputation as one of the most violent in Nigeria. Organised Criminal Gangs (OCGs), also known locally as cults, have impacted both communities and the multinational oil firms. Poverty and lack of employment opportunity has resulted in a huge expansion of illegal bunkering. Apart from the huge wealth this has brought to a few, it has also caused massive, long-term degradation to the environment.

Militancy has long been used to profile local grievances and pressure the state and federal government for inward investment. The last sequence of militant attacks in oil infrastructure was in 2016, perpetrated by the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Alliance (NDGJA). Most recently, the Biafran insurgency has infiltrated into militant politics. From early 2021, Niger Delta militant groups such as the "Niger Delta People's Salvation Force" led by Asari-Dokubo, joined an insurgency in South-eastern Nigeria which pitted Biafran separatists against Nigerian security forces, armed Fulani herders, and bandits. Asari-Dokubo formed the "Biafra Customary Government" (BCG) in March 2021. Igbos in the Niger Delta also joined the Biafran insurgency. Meanwhile, the NDA reportedly continue to target and destroy pipelines, while local OCGs exploited the unrest to stage raids¹.

Rivers is currently assessed as a MEDIUM risk State.

1.1. TERRORISM.

Niger Delta Militant groups have carried out attacks in Rivers State over the past 10 years. Most of their targets have been government and private oil facilities, although there have been occasions where military and other security agencies were attacked.

Since the proscription of IPOB and, by association, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), there have been attacks on security forces that could be attributed as terrorism. At least one Rivers based Niger Delta force

¹ Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_in_the_Niger_Delta

has aligned itself to the IPOB cause and has threatened, if not yet positively conducted, attacks on security forces.

Terrorism is a threat to the vaccination programme. It is rated as **MEDIUM** but can be rated as LOW with recommended mitigation measures.

1.2. CRIME

Cultism is one of the major sources of violence in the Niger Delta, including Rivers state. Cult groups have been active in Rivers state since their emergence between the 1980s and 1990s, with the main rival gangs of Vikings and KKK causing violence especially on the streets of Port Harcourt. Since then, various cult groups have sprung up in various parts of the state; starting from 1999, violence has seen a 'gradual but steady increase' in the state. According to 2019 research which studied 18 of the 23 LGAs in Rivers state, the areas most affected by cult related violence between 2009 and 2018 were Emouha, Andoni, Ahoada East, Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Ikwerre, and Port Harcourt City LGAs.

Amnesty international (AI) reported an increase of cult related violence in Rivers state during 2019, noting that loss of lives and rising impunity were making life precarious for some communities in the state. According to AI, at least 60 people were killed during violent gang attacks in Rivers in 2019, especially in Khana and Gokana LGAs. In 2019, gang-related violence in Port Harcourt was also the cause of various degrees of internal displacement within the state, as well as rising unemployment and the movement of businesses outside of the state. In 2020, Rivers was the second state within the Niger Delta most affected by violence (after Delta state), with Port Harcourt among the most violent LGAs of the Niger Delta.

Cult and gang related incidents in the state decreased in 2020, compared to the previous year, however it continued to be one of the main drivers of conflict in Rivers, along with criminality, communal violence and violent protests involving, inter alia, #EndSARS supporters and IPOB members. In a 2019 article, citing 2017 data, Rivers state was ranked second of Nigerian states with highest rates of kidnapping (after Zamfara, and before Lagos and Jigawa). In 2020, kidnappings, piracy, robbery, clashes between gang members and security operatives were reported as the main crime-related incidents, occurring mostly in Port Harcourt, Obio/Akpor, Khana and Oyigbo LGAs.

This threat is rated at **HIGH** and can be rated as LOW with mitigating measures.

1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

Communal violence in Rivers state has historically been triggered by battles over control of oil and gas facilities as well as by disputed borders. Interethnic conflict in the state has involved communities such as the Ijaw Okrikan and the Eleme (who are related to the Ogoni). Rivers is one of the states in Nigeria where incidents of clashes between herders and farmers are reported to occur with more regularity, intensity and causing more bloodshed.

The drivers of communal violence and civil unrest in Rivers State can be traced back to the post-war period. Displaced Igbo survivors of the Biafran war found that, when trying to return to their home communities, they had become victims of the newly formed Rivers State Government's post-war promulgation of the 'Abandoned Property (Custody and Management) Edict No.8 of 1969' (Law of Rivers State). Although the act was not necessarily aimed at a particular party, the group it most affected, and who felt most aggrieved,

were returning Igbos. Returnees found their properties occupied by others under recourse of the act. This in turn forced the returnees to find accommodation in other communities, where they were tagged as 'non-indigenes'. Additional displacements have occurred intermittently over the following decades, as people were forced to move from conflict areas generated by militant group actions against the oil industry. A research paper published in the Journal of International Cooperation and Development in Nov 2021² notes that although displacement typically brings diversity to communities, it may not be necessarily be welcomed by the host community. An IDP's status separates internally displaced persons from other co-citizens by social markers and thus gives them a certain identity. the most dominant narratives among IDPs were related to the sense of segregation and stigmatization generated by the local community. With this level of discord, it does not take much of a spark to generate and fuel violent inter-communal confrontation.

Most recently, the often-violent actions of the IPOB activists (ESN) are the catalyst for community displacement and inter-communal tension. In response to clashes between IPOB activists and police officers in Oyigbo town in October 2020, Rivers state Governor imposed a 24-hour curfew on 23 October. During these clashes, residents accused Nigerian security forces of carrying out extrajudicial killings in Oyigbo. Amnesty International, cited by BBC, also stated that they received reports about soldiers allegedly invading homes and reports by residents 'seeing dead bodies on the street, allegedly shot by soldiers.

In 2020, kidnappings, piracy, robbery, clashes between gang members and security operatives were reported as the main crime-related incidents, occurring mostly in Port Harcourt, Obio/Akpor, Khana and Oyigbo LGAs. There were reports of deteriorating security situation in former Biafra during 2020, with incidents of fighting between government forces and an Igbo separatist paramilitary group, including in Rivers state. Clashes were reported in Oyigbo town, which is considered as an IPOB stronghold.

The IMPACT can be severe, putting the assessment rating at **MEDIUM**.

1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

Roads in Rivers state vary between well paved highways in the vicinity of Port Harcourt and some other major towns, to extremely poor and sometimes impassable roads. The volume of rainfall across the year, along with the volume of traffic and a tendency to overload lorries beyond the design capacity of the road surfaces, all contribute to rapid degradation of road surfaces.

Travellers in Rivers state are reported to face rising insecurity, as robbery, kidnapping and rape have been reported on some roads of the state. Some of the highways affected by insecurity in Rivers state include the Port Harcourt-Owerri Road, the Ahoada Ndele-Rumuji Emohua axis of the East-West Road, the Mbiama, Nkpolu, and the Ogoni and Akwa Ibom areas of the East-West Road.

This threat is rated as **MEDIUM** risk

² 'Ethnic Conflicts and Internally Displaced Persons in Rumuekpe and Igwuruta Communities of Rivers State, Nigeria', Edafe, Okoye and Agbo, Nov 2021 - : <https://doi.org/10.36941/jicd-2021-0016>.

1.5. KIDNAP.

Kidnap has continued to be a major threat to all strata of society in Rivers state and in Nigeria over the past 2 years. However, Rivers kidnap rates are such that the threat can be categorised as **MEDIUM** when compared the threat levels in other parts of the country.

1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

Due to high levels of poverty and unemployment in Rivers state, proper hygiene and sanitation is beyond the means of many. This allows for occasional outbreaks of Yellow Fever, as well endemic malaria across the state. However, the major threat now is the COVID 19 pandemic, which has hit Rivers State that hardest of any state in Nigeria. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM**.

1.7. FIRE EVENT.

Parts of Rivers state are densely populated with myriad buildings that do not meet construction norms or basic safety standards. In parts, structures are makeshift and fabricated out of wood and tin. Elevated levels of poverty mean that many live in slum conditions. Electricity supply is scarce and electricity theft by short cutting the metering is common. Given the density of population and lack of standard health and safety norms, fire is a significant risk. A risk rating of **MEDIUM** is projected for this threat.

1.8. ENVIRONMENT (WEATHER).

The main environmental hazard in Rivers is flooding. Rivers is a predominantly low lying, coastal state in the Niger delta. As such, it is susceptible to seasonal flooding during intense downpours which occur almost any time of the year but particularly during the long rainy season between May and November. Flooding occurs even more swiftly due terrible waste sanitation management which results in blocked drainage systems throughout the city. The flooding can be very disruptive due to resulting road closures and traffic congestion. The IMPACT to staff is minor, putting the projected risk rating at **LOW**.

1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

Cults have strong control over their territories. Access to areas of control often needs to be preceded with protracted negotiations with various leaders. The interface with traditional leaders is often complex. All parties need to agree for any organised programme activity to occur. Acknowledgement of status, due deference and the observance of community traditional protocols are critical to the long-term success of programme delivery. The risk to the programme of issues interrupting smooth delivery is **MEDIUM**.

1.10. DEPLOYMENT.

Communities within the depths of the Niger river estuary can be exceedingly difficult to access. Many can only be reached by boat. Communities are often interspersed with illegal bunkering sites so there is a risk of a programme clash with bunkering criminals, who may also come from the same communities the programme is trying to reach. Interruption of vaccine outload could risk damage to the vaccine efficacy, either due to time or temperature.

1.11. POLITICAL.

Politicians in Rivers state are said to have requested the support of cult groups during elections, and to seek power, by funding and arming some of these groups to unleash violence against opponents. In 2016, the Rivers state governor launched an amnesty for gang members in the state willing to surrender their weapons. The amnesty was stopped in June 2019 since many who were granted amnesty had returned to criminal activities. Politically related interference to the programme in the lead up to elections is a clear risk, assessed as **MEDIUM**.

1.12. CORRUPTION.

The criminal activities of Niger Delta insurgent groups were reduced because of a federal government funded amnesty programme. Over time, both inflation and corruption has reduced the stipends received. Also, there is now a new generation of youth who were too young at the time but who are now agitating for compensation for the loss of their oil resource. These groups are now threatening to return to sabotage operations. Such groups may seek to extort payments from programme staff in order to allow access to cult territories. This risk is assessed as **MEDIUM**.

1.13. COMMUNICATION.

Given the long-standing community tensions, the remoteness of some communities and the perceived credibility of false news and counter-narratives, there is significant risk to programme effectiveness. Unless the communications message is constant, with messaging on a frequent tempo across all communication mediums, there is a strong chance of counter-narratives warping people's confidence in the efficacy of the vaccine and doubts as to the Government's actual intent. This risk is assessed as **MEDIUM**.

2. EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS.

2.1. INTRODUCTION.

In carrying out this risk assessment, a wide range of information sources have been used, including but not limited to:

- Feedback with programme and state government employees via an SRA checklist.
- Official UK, US and Australian Government websites.
- The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project website.
- Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics.
- UN Department of Safety & Security (Nigeria)
- Open and closed commercial security sources available to the Consultant.
- Discussion and peer review within the Consultant management team who collectively have a large amount of security and risk assessment experience.

In identifying the key risks, several factors were considered such as:

- The threat of terrorists targeting the vaccination programme.
- The threat of civil unrest in the proximity causing damage to the vaccination locations.
- The risk of natural disasters, particularly flooding and earthquake.
- Reputational, political, and financial risks to the donor and programmatic organisation.

The following section entitled Risk Description and Estimation will identify the risks that are considered relevant to this report. For a full description of the probability and impact scores, please refer to Annexes A and B.

2.2. RISK DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION.

2.2.1. TERRORISM.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team or member of the public being killed or injured by a terrorist attack against the vaccination location itself or nearby targets including other building in use by the programme roll out.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device	An attack using a parked or moving vehicle to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the vaccination center, including lorry, car, motorized rickshaw or moped at any of the pedestrian entrances or the only vehicle	This form of attack has never occurred in the state and is unlikely to be used by terror groups that operate in the state.

	entrance. This includes any congregations of people (i.e., queues at entrances).	
Person Borne IED	An attack using a person(s) to deliver an explosive charge(s) to an entrance area, lobby, or internal space, including internal spaces in use by the vaccination programme.	Identified terror groups in the state do not use this form of attack.
Marauding Terrorist Attack	An attack by single or teams of people using guns, IED's and grenades to injure or kill people at close quarters, either during the attack or by a delayed hostage scenario using the media to maximum effect	The NDM that operate in the state have used this form of attack against both civilians and the government. In their enforcement of the recent sit-at-home protest, small armed groups paraded communities and attacked people who did not comply with the directive.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
1 Terrorism	2	4	MEDIUM

2.2.2. CRIME.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by a criminal event such as a mugging, theft, extortion, or act of physical violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements that has a serious impact on the programme delivery (theft of vaccine, equipment etc.) or reputation of the programme.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Armed Attack	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team falls victim to a criminal act, either losing valuables or money, by mugging or pickpocketing or some other form of theft. An attack by single or teams of people, including OCGs, using guns to injure or kill people at close quarters. This is often associated with community invasion for looting rustling and kidnap.	Violent crime is common in the state and region. Personnel involved in the vaccination programme may be perceived as well off, especially as they use items like tablets, cameras and other survey equipment thereby making them targets. There is risk of collateral damage because of being in proximity to an attack. This has been reported by past vaccination teams in the state.
Sexual assault	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team falling victim to a sexual assault by male predator(s) resulting in harassment, sexual disease, injury, or death.	Incidents of rape have been reported in popular nightlife areas, as well as in private homes. This is a clear risk to programme staff, especially at night and if moving alone.
Organized Crime	Infiltration of an organized criminal group into the vaccination programme, resulting in fraud, theft, loss of assets/funds, employment malpractice or general adverse publicity for both NCDC and the State Government if exposed.	There are criminal gangs operating in Rivers who may seek to exploit personnel involved in the vaccination programme by coercion, extortion, or black mail.
Theft	Theft of vaccine or equipment vital for delivery that negatively impacts ability to hit required quota. Smuggling of product out of programme or other illicit use of product that impacts programme at state level.	Recreational drug taking is widely practiced in some parts of Nigeria, so items like syringes and other medical items could be stolen. These items could also be resold as pharmaceutical products on the illegal market.
Staff dishonesty	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team engaging in dishonest conduct, such as theft from vaccination locations. Theft of assets, or fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself.	Personnel involved in the vaccination programme could be compromised to resell items meant to be free on demand for payment before vaccination. Other forms of staff dishonesty are cases where staff produce inaccurate vaccination information to gain transport allowance or for other reasons.
Drug taking or smuggling	Instance of drug taking within program premises for individual use, or the taking place of drug dealing either retail, i.e., to users, or wholesale, to other drug dealers. Use of methanol to enhance low grade alcohol resulting in death or injury of the imbiber	Recreational drug taking is widely practiced in some parts of the country, including River state. Locally recruited 'casual' staff will require appropriate security vetting during the employment process.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
2 Crime	4	3	HIGH

2.2.3. CIVIL UNREST.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by unrest caused by rioting, demonstrations, or political violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements due to brand ownership of World Bank as an international donor. Any anti-vaccination movement targeting the programme in the form of local protests.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Communal Clash/ Riot	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being caught in a localized protest/riot outside or in vaccination location or other connected location e.g., office/laboratory facilities.	Events like the ENDSARS protests of 2020 that disrupted daily activities could reoccur in the state. The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) called for a nationwide strike aimed at stopping Federal Government plans to increase pump price of fuel this year is an event that could threaten the vaccination programme.
Demonstration	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being caught in a demonstration either directed towards the vaccination programme, vaccination center or close by.	Possible demonstration by members of the vaccination programme to express their dissatisfaction at the current salary they are being paid. This could disrupt the vaccination programme and cause reputational damage.
Political violence	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being affected or injured by political violence associated by an election or local issue that is associated with the vaccination programme.	The political activities leading to next year's elections are likely to generate regular and sometimes violent protests. This could lead to the escalation of security measures with the associated application of lock-down measures, in tempo with the rise in threat.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Civil Unrest	3	3	MEDIUM

2.2.4. TRAVEL RISK.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Rivers recorded 26 road traffic accidents in the second quarter of 2021. This was an above average number of incidents in the South-south region.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Motivation for scenario
Road Traffic Accident	Incidence of a programme vehicle being involved in a road traffic accident whilst effecting delivery of personnel or vaccine supplies to programme sites.	RTAs occur regularly due to poor roads, badly maintained vehicles, and poor driving skills, whilst over speeding often results in serious injuries or fatalities.
Vehicle Theft or Hijack	Incidence of a programme vehicle being stolen whilst parked and unattended, or actively hijacked from programme personnel following and encountering an IVCP.	Opportunity vehicle theft can occur if vehicles have insufficient security out of hours. Vehicle hijack is a possibility but often vehicles are abandoned, and the personnel are kidnapped. IVCPs can occur anywhere but are very prevalent in the regions where terrorists and OCGs are operating.
Boat Accident	Incidence of a boat accident where programme activities require the movement of personnel and stores by water.	Boat accidents occur where poor safety measures are followed – overloading, over speeding and failure to wear life jackets.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
RTA	2	4	MEDIUM

2.2.5. KIDNAP.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being kidnapped either on or off work. Staff of the project could be perceived to be well to do or they may intend to get ransom from the project or government.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Ideological Kidnap	Terror groups may kidnap staff of the project to pressure the government accept their demands. This is common in the northeast part of the country with insurgent groups like Boko Haram. The kidnap and detention of a programme member of staff to achieve political aims.	These attacks are not usually motivated by financial reasons but intend to force government decisions in their favor. The threat of this tactic exists in Rivers but has not been used.
Kidnap for Ransom	Staff of the project could be kidnapped for economic reasons I.e., to collect ransom	Kidnap for ransom remains an enduring risk across the country, driven by the disparity in wealth and lack of employment prospects. Kidnaps are often conducted by OCGs. The past decade has seen a surge in kidnappings in the Southeastern regions. However, the risk is pervasive across the entire country. A country wide vaccination programme will necessarily need constant and effective media marketing. This will bring the programme to the attention of OCGs, potentially increasing risk.
Express Kidnap (One Chance)	The short-term kidnap of a programme member of staff to force the removal of available cash from ATMs.	Express kidnap is particularly prevalent where there is wealth and a high frequency of ATMs, as found in the commercial centers of major cities, towns, and suburb hubs. This type of event does occur in Port Harcourt.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Kidnap	3	4	HIGH

2.2.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

SCOPE OF RISK:

The contraction of disease, sickness, or workplace accident of such severity as to need an emergency response and temporary or long-term hospitalization of a staff member. Staff working in the vaccination programme are more exposed than the average person. This makes the risk of infection to COVID-19 or other diseases higher.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Disease	Incidence of a member of staff contracting an endemic disease because of their programme delivery and/or interaction with target stakeholders, causing them to be unable to work or requiring their hospitalisation/isolation..	Although there are many endemic diseases in the country, it is anticipated that the nature of the work will engender a very high level of personal and programme sanitation. Such SOPs will significantly reduce the risk.
Sickness	Incidence of sickness due to personal physiology or due to the ingestion of a sick bug, causing them to be unable to work.	Despite programme and personal sanitary drills, people regularly fall ill due to chronic conditions or food poisoning. This is a perennial risk for all.
Accident	Incidence of a work-related accident during programme delivery which is of such severity that they are temporarily or permanently unable to continue their duties.	Accidents regularly occur in work environments and particularly where there are high numbers of people. The risk of serious accidents will be reduced by proper planning, rehearsals, and strict adherence to safety SOPs.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Medical	2	3	LOW

2.2.7. FIRE EVENT.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Fire incidents could occur within project facilities, thereby damaging equipment, or harming personnel.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Fire Event	The collateral involvement in a fire event causing damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment, or personnel due to the dense and chaotic nature of the urban landscape.	Fire incident could occur in project facilities. Poor firefighting equipment in project offices makes the threat possible. Fire is a particular risk in the vicinity of urban market areas, slums, and other zones where illegal and haphazard building has been allowed to occur. This risk is elevated in certain parts of the major towns and cities.
Arson	The malicious use of fire to cause the damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment, or personnel.	Project facilities could be set on fire by saboteurs for assorted reasons. Arson is often used by ex-staff members who bear a grudge, due to being sacked or failing to obtain employment. Arson is also used as a tool to raise tensions by political agitators. In certain parts of the country the political and community dynamics may elevate arson as a risk to the programme. This type of incident is thought unlikely to occur in Rivers state.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Fire Event	2	2	LOW

2.2.8. ENVIRONMENTAL (WEATHER).

SCOPE OF RISK:

Severe weather could disrupt vaccination activities through flooding, land slide, infrastructural destruction, heat wave, and so on.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
High Winds	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured, or the damage or destruction of programme assets, due to exceedingly high wind gusts.	The risk is not necessarily from the wind itself but from projectiles picked up and accelerated by the force of the wind. This is an occasional, usually very short-term risk during the rainy season.
Lightning	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured because of lightning.	A high incidence of lightning is common in the vicinity of tropical storms during the rainy season. Tropical storms are more frequent and occur over the greatest part of the year in the south of the country.
Floods	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being killed or injured during floods caused by heavy rain. Damage or destruction to the vaccination center or surrounding areas by flooding.	Tropical storms can generate exceedingly high volumes of localized rainfall in short periods of time. In cities, flooding can quickly occur due to poor sanitation resulting in drain blockage. In rural areas, flash flooding can occur in low lying areas whilst sheet floods can wash away roads across flat areas in the North. Although there is risk, this should be countered with proper planning and coordination.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Environmental	2	2	LOW

2.2.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Internal programme management issues either in the management of personnel or resource. Issues like industrial action is an example of this. A failure to thoughtfully plan delivery sequencing, inform stakeholders and train programme staff in advance of project start, risks unexpected issues which will delay, alarm, and potentially cause the failure of the programme.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
COVID Protocol	A failure to insist on strict Covid protocols at vaccination centers causes these same centers to become Covid super spreader fulcrums.	The pre-roll out communication exercise needs to fully inform stakeholders of the protocol requirements to be applied to enter a vaccination clinic and inform stakeholders of the queueing protocols once admitted to sites. Failure to adhere to advertised protocols risks further spread of Covid.
ID capture	A failure to capture reliable information on the numbers being vaccinated progressively throughout the programme results in doubts as to data efficacy and a loss of confidence in the process.	Poor pre-roll out communication risks stakeholders being unable to provide ID on arrival at vaccination centers. Any IT based data capture system risks interruption due to power loss and will need to be rugged to operate in the field
SF discord with Civilian population	incidence of elements of the supporting security force generating tension due to their discord with the local community.	incidence of elements of the supporting security force generating tension due to their discord with the local community.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
PROGRAMMATIC	3	3	MEDIUM

2.2.10. DEPLOYMENT.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Logistic or distribution issues that could hinder the vaccination programme either through lack of vehicles, use of the right vehicles 4x4 vehicles to hard-to-reach areas, vehicle share with other projects that could affect the flexibility of the programme or just lacking professionally trained drivers to carryout field activities. Deployment can be in form of not having sufficient gear or personnel for field activities. Operational and logistical aspects of the programme roll out face risk interruption to vaccine delivery to field sites and, potentially, risk to vaccine efficacy if vaccine storage temperatures cannot be maintained. In certain areas, distance and poor road conditions could impact on staff deployments and vaccine center opening/closing times.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Distribution Disruption	Poor logistical management causing interruption of vaccine supply to the field, leading to delays in the overall programme	Poor coordination of transport and supplies will cause delays in delivery. Security challenges could trigger decision points within the security framework which cause temporary or permanent cessation of programme delivery in specific areas. These challenges will be present in remote areas and in the many regions of heightened security threat. This could be a particular risk when trying to reach remote communities in the recesses of the estuaries.
Power Destruction	Incidence of power interruption leading to write off vaccine stock due to heat damage. (According to brand, Covid 19 vaccines must be stored within a narrow temperature range).	Unless mitigations are put in place at each delivery point for the duration of the vaccination exercise, the risk of vaccine damage due to power loss is a perennial one across the country.
Unexpected vaccination window extension	Incidence of interruption to the smooth deployment of stock and medical delivery of vaccinations leading to unplanned extension of the delivery time.	Unplanned time extensions to programme delivery risk disruption elsewhere in the programme and potentially increase risk to staff due to extended presence in high-risk areas.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
DEPLOYMENT		2	MEDIUM

2.2.11. POLITICAL.

SCOPE OF RISK:

The concurrent acceleration of political campaigns in the lead up to the 2023 elections could impinge, tangentially or directly, on the programme's ability to deliver effectively. In these areas there is increased security risk which will challenge the programme's ability to access areas and deliver vaccines. Elevated levels of interference or highjack of the vaccination process by individuals or parties for the sake of popularity. Politicians may want to take credit for the vaccination process by holding political rallies on vaccination days aimed at benefiting from the sensitization process or by openly taking credit for organising the vaccination itself.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Election	Concurrent political campaigns causing dilution to programme communications or directly impacting the effectiveness of the vaccine delivery programme.	in the 2023 Nigerian elections about a year away, political parties and individuals will make effort to benefit from the vaccination programme which may increase the profile of the project to anti-government groups like NDM. Also, Funds or support could be withheld to pressure personnel within the vaccination programme to identify with them or work within political process.
Traditional Rulers and other traditional institutions	Failure to apply the correct notification protocols in the lead up to vaccine delivery causing a snub to the traditional ruler in that area. A withdrawal of royal or religious approval could result in a loss of buy in by the local community.	Local cultural protocols are an important part of community life. A failure to both understand and follow the correct procedures could result in an extremely poor turn out at vaccine centres.
Contested Areas	Incidence of restricted access. Programme delivery might not be possible in certain parts of the country where the legitimate government's authority is being challenged.	Some LGA's could pose additional security risks that will require additional planning and security mitigation. Even then, there is a risk that some areas might have to be declared 'no-go.'
Discrimination	Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team not being impartial during vaccine administration	Likelihood of administering vaccine on the basis of bias to politics, religion, race, tribe and gender remains possible in Rivers state.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
POLITICAL	3	4	HIGH

2.2.12. CORRUPTION.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team to engage in theft or fraud in order to enrich themselves

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Staff dishonesty	A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself.	Fraud or embezzlement of funds could rapidly sap the tempo and vigour of the vaccine programme roll out, resulting in failure to vaccinate large parts of the population. Norecent reports of such in Rivers state but it remains a likely risk.
Extortion	Extraction of resources from the programme by a staff member because they have been placed under duress by a third party.	Locally recruited programme staff could be placed in this situation by criminal elements within the local community. No reports of such but remains likely.
Bribery	Incentivisation of programme staff to disrupt or cause the failure of the vaccine programme.	Politically motivated agents could seek to disrupt the programme in order to make the incumbent government (federal, state or local) look weak and disorganized. Bribery linked to political campaigning is common in Rivers state.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	3	3	MEDIUM

2.2.13. COMMUNICATION.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Sensitization efforts to convince people to accept the vaccine. There has been a series of false news on the vaccine on every news platform including traditional media.


RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Sensitization	Poor communication and lack of timely programme advertising resulting in low take up of the vaccine amongst communities	A weak and poorly structured communication campaign risks failure to properly notify every one of the programmes timings and intent.
Coordination	Failure to coordinate attendance scheduling, resulting in excessive queues with long waiting times, generating dissent and potential civil unrest.	Poor notification of attendance schedules poses a risk of excessive numbers and crowd management challenges at vaccine delivery sites.
False News	Incidence of social media challenges as to the efficacy of the vaccines versus traditional medicines, generating doubt and leading to low turnout at vaccine centers.	The use of social media to sow false information is a recognized problem in countries which already have high vaccine take-up.
Counter Narrative	incidence of anti-establishment commentary suggesting that the vaccine programme is a government plot to infect the population with unknown chemicals, resulting in stakeholder refusal to be vaccinated.	The use of social media to plant doubt and fear in the minds of the population is a recognized problem in countries which already have high vaccine take up.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Counter Narratives	2	4	MEDIUM

3. ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED SECURITY RISKS (EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL).



	Threat Scenario	Impact	Probability	Risk
1	Terrorism	3 Moderate	3 Likely	Medium
2	Crime	3 Moderate	4 Highly Likely	High
3	Civil Unrest	3 Moderate	3 Likely	Medium
4	Travel risk	3 Moderate	2.6 Likely	Medium
5	Kidnap	4 Severe	3 Likely	High
6	Medical Emergency	3 Moderate	2.6 Likely	Medium
7	Fire Event	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
8	Environmental (Weather)	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
9	Programmatic	3 Moderate	3 Likely	Medium
10	Deployment	2 Minor	4 Highly Likely	Medium
11	Political	4 Severe	3 Likely	High
12	Corruption	3 Moderate	3 Likely	Medium
13	Communication	4 Severe	2 Possible	Medium

The two major risks identified in the above analysis are Kidnap and Crime, both in terms of Probability and Impact. Their primary impact is psychological stress, possible physical injury or death, and damage to, or loss of, assets. Significant planning and preparation should therefore take place to reduce these as much as possible, in advance of the vaccination exercise.

With the 2023 elections fast approaching, politics all influence vaccination activities either directly or indirectly. Rivers state is a politically conscious state led by a highly charismatic Governor in Wike. Governor Wike was recently picked as a possible running mate to the PDP Presidential aspirant Atiku Abubakar, which is likely to further increase political activities in the state both. The governor is highly influential among Rivers people and when he did not do his vaccination openly like other political leaders in the country, although he has supported the vaccination efforts, this action created a lot of apprehension among Rivers people.

Several Niger Delta Militant groups operate in Rivers and the South-south region, they have been quiet over the past few years. They have occasionally made public statements against the government and individuals, but no major attacks have been recorded in the state. They have never carried out attacks against vaccination or health related programmes and can be considered a minimal risk. However, they remain a potent threat

that could target government related facilities like government plated vehicles that vaccination projects currently use in the state.

Rivers NSCDC officers confirmed that they participate in regular training on COVID-19 vaccination process and how to handle security issues during vaccination like community relations and other human rights topics. However, a major factor issue that the command face is logistics. They do not have a dedicated vehicle to support the vaccination and depend on regular units from the head office in the capital, Port Harcourt, to supervise field officers involved in the vaccination process.

Some major deployment issue faced by the Rivers vaccination teams are additional training, logistics and short vaccine expiry dates. Staff suffer from inadequate logistical support for vaccine programmes. Vital activities like movement of vaccines either from the airport to storage facilities or distribution to vaccine administration locations around the state has been a major challenge. The Moderna vaccine, which has a 30-day expiry period has been difficult to administer, especially given the logistical challenges.

There is need for increased sensitization work at the local community level to combat false news. Strong religious and traditional beliefs had added to communication issues experienced in the state. Religious and traditional groups need to be taken along as stakeholders in combating false information on the COVID-19 vaccination. Government agencies like the NOA should be involved in the sensitization efforts.

4. RISK MITIGATION MEASURES & PLAN.

4.1. INTRODUCTION.

A multi-layered approach to security is effective as it can mitigate risks using generic principles. This section will propose several risk controls for approval by the NCDC programme team and State Government to address the risks identified above. As discussed initially, they will be written as objective statements, i.e., the desired state that is to be achieved, not how to achieve it. As shown below, each control's predicted reduction on its risk will be documented. This will then form the basis for the Security Management Framework, which will be written after this risk assessment has been accepted and signed off by the client.

4.2. INDIVIDUAL RISK MITIGATIONS.

4.2.1. TERRORISM.

RISK CONTROLS:

- State Security Manager will issue advisories on any areas where specific threat is expected based on liaison with local authorities.
- It is clearly impractical staff to avoid all public places, places of worship etc but duty of care suggests informing them of targets as part of security awareness training.
- Avoidance of pattern setting (times, routes, locations, and vehicle/personnel profiles) is to be actively managed by project security focal point.
- Information assurance ('need to know') procedures to be implemented.
- Organisation should avoid media actions that could make them targets of terror groups like media statements, publications etc.
- Security Adviser advice to staff to maintain a low profile when working in Rivers.
- Emergency response for all personnel to include immediate action on terrorist attack on a public place or civic building with staff present.
- CMT training to include terror incident in a major city like Port Harcourt.
- Management team to actively monitor all personnel, especially those on field work outside the office.
- Identify potential Safe Haven locations in event of a series of attacks making movement difficult.
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of a terrorist attack on specific venues.

NEW RISK SCORE: new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
1 Terrorism	1	3	LOW

4.2.2. CRIME.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Staff advised to always maintain a low profile.
- State Security Manager to track criminal trends and events and notify organisation's Management of any significant issues that could affect the project
- Security awareness training to include avoidance of pattern setting information security and management of personal profile.
- Drivers are instructed not to travel in the early morning before 6:30am and after 6pm
- Drivers to be security awareness trained
- High value movements (cash or valuable equipment) to be planned in coordination with security adviser
- For long distance interstate travel staff are advised to travel in a 2-car convoy with the chase vehicle carrying passengers.
- Hotels and extended stay accommodation are audited and approved by security adviser
- Staff are advised on how to improve site security at their individual residences and can seek personal advice from security advisor.
- Emergency response procedure through a local CMT to handle incidents on a case-by-case basis.
- Security Hotline managed by State Security Manager is an immediate response point of contact in an incident.

NEW RISK SCORE: new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Crime	3	3	MEDIUM

4.2.3. CIVIL UNREST.

RISK CONTROLS:

- A rapid response security team should be setup and ready to respond to security issues affecting the vaccination teams.
- During election periods work in the state is suspended or reduced as much as possible in the state.
- Security personnel working with the project at any point must have been briefed and understand on the ESS 4, page 48 of the World Bank ESF. All rules of engagement must be based on these standards. Issues like unrest, crime, and other physical threats must adhere to these rules. These training should be led by the State Security Manager.
- Security adviser to issue advisories to all personnel including drivers of areas to avoid based on liaison with local authorities.
- Security adviser to check all proposed routes avoid areas of potential unrest
- staff to be advised must not participate in protests or demonstrations.
- CMT to include immediate action on civil unrest situation developing
- Identify potential Safe Haven locations in event of widespread unrest in the city
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of protracted unrest in Rivers.

NEW RISK SCORE: new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Civil Unrest	3	3	MEDIUM

4.2.4. TRAVEL RISK.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Sufficient vehicles should be provided to vaccination teams.
- A proper journey management system should be established for the vaccination teams that involve proper planning, monitoring and response to incident. This should be managed by the State Security Manager.
- Drivers should go through a defensive driver training programme.
- Enforce speed limits through vehicle tracking.
- Driver selection and training based on Rivers experience.
- Person responsible to assess rental cars before hire and report as fit for purpose.
- Person responsible to conduct regular (at least monthly) vehicles checks including spare parts and medical equipment.
- Limit driving hours to reduce fatigue and stress among the drivers. It is noted this is difficult to enforce but it is a serious cause of RTA, and the issue cannot be ignored.
- Night travels is not allowed.
- Nearest Hospitals and Ambulance services MUST be identified by the State Security Manager.
- Contact lists for physicians within the medical facilities need to be established by State Security Manager.
- Remote location **Med Evac** plans should be understood by all travellers.
- Staff should be trained in first response first aid.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Travel	2	2	LOW

4.2.5. KIDNAP.

RISK CONTROLS:

- State Security Manager to disseminate any new kidnap specific advice from Spearfish sources or other agencies as a priority (UNDSS/FCO/OSAC/ASIS/GTR) as well as government security agencies (GSA).
- Kidnap awareness to be included in induction training including varying routes to work and social locations, information security, reducing profile to kidnapers.
- staff are advised to maintain a low profile always during security briefings.
- Staff should not set patterns or routines as much as possible.
- Hired vehicles should be briefed on kidnap prevention.
- K & R training and preparedness for all staff should be done at least once a year.
- Travel itinerary is kept confidential and shared on a need-to-know basis.
- Person responsible for journey management to enforce proper management of staff movement in the field.
- Staff Tracking and Journey Management guidelines.
- K & R setup like Proof of Life should be done for staff.
- K & R insurance policy and requirements to be reviewed and advised by organisation's Management.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Kidnap	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Awareness training for long term visitors (especially any living outside hotels) on measures to prevent mosquito bites, including the use of high-concentration insect repellent, COVID 19 PPE (Personal Protective Equipment), protective clothing, and netting at night.
- Organisation's office should be spaced out in line with COVID 19 protocol.
- Security adviser to issue advisory on COVID 19 safety in Rivers.
- Security adviser to issue advisories based on emerging health risks as well as COVID 19 infection numbers.
- Medical insurance cover must be adequate for private health clinics and medical evacuation.
- CMT to cover medical emergency as well as response plan in the event of an emergency like COVID 19.
- Signages and information should be displayed throughout the office environment both for visitors and staff on COVID 19 prevention and response numbers.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Medical	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.7. FIRE EVENT.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Hotels are assessed by security adviser for the best fire safety standards.
- Staff are trained during security briefing on procedures and responses during fire emergencies.
- Electricity panels should be properly labelled and secured.
- Organisation's storage rooms must be adequate.
- Main and alternate muster points identified for evacuating building.
- Fire warden to ensure personnel list available to account for all personnel at office.
- Emergency response plan for fire at all locations to be briefed to new personnel by fire warden.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Fire incident	2	2	LOW

4.2.8. ENVIRONMENTAL (WEATHER).

RISK CONTROLS:

- Security adviser ensures that the hotels staff stay in are not located in flood areas.
- Proper 4x4 vehicles should be provided to the field teams that can handle the terrain during severe weather.
- Project staff must also understand and adhere to the World Bank Environment and Community Health and Safety standards (ESS4).
- Warning is also issued by the security adviser to leave out time before appointments to avoid being caught up in traffic due to flooding.
- CMT can be formed in the event staff are trapped in areas of the city due to flooding.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Environment	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Mechanism to deal with staff unrest within the programme should be developed and strengthened. Issues like misconduct and discipline should be handled in an open and transparent manner.
- Staff salaries should be paid on time especially field staff. Local government staff involved in the vaccination process should be handed remuneration to encourage them to participate in the future.
- Project staff should be briefed on World Bank health and safety standards contained in World Bank Environment and Social Framework handbook.
- Regular stakeholder engagement should be arranged regularly and local groups like traditional rulers, local Juju/Sharmen, youth groups, women groups, local unions, and prominent individuals should be included.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Programmatic	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.10. DEPLOYMENT.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Adequate vehicles should be provided to vaccination teams. The teams currently share with other programmes and agencies which has slowed the vaccination process in the state.
- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be involved in the vaccination drive. The agency should be actively involved in dispelling fake news about the virus.
- Local Juju/Sharmen in local communities should be carried along in the campaign for the vaccination even if they are provided with incentives.
- The programme should have a close relationship with security personnel like the police to get security information before deployment. Areas where there may be conflict in the state should be avoided completely.
- A proper journey management process should be established
- Staff should be briefed on security response to incidents while in the field.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Deployment	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.11. POLITICAL.

RISK CONTROLS:

- In Rivers, the government have been actively involved in the vaccination process, however, the office of the governor should be more openly involved in the vaccination process. The Rivers Governor can use more of his influence to persuade people in the state to accept the vaccine.
- Due to the coming 2023 elections, the vaccination programme should be done earlier than later. This is important because the closer the programme gets to the coming election the bigger the possibility of politics taking advantage of the vaccination platform.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Political	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.12. CORRUPTION.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Anti-corruption agencies like EFCC and ICPC should be actively involved at some stage in the monitoring of programme funds and use.
- Internal staff conduct mechanisms like due process should be strengthened and transparent to ensure funds and processes are not tampered with.
- A whistle blower line and system should be formed where staff or consultants can safely report corruption issues.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Corruption	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

4.2.13. COMMUNICATION.

RISK CONTROLS:

- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be part of the sensitization campaign for the vaccination process. Regular radio, TV and social media programmes should be carried out to debunk misunderstandings or false news about the vaccination.
- Religious and traditional groups should be included as stakeholders in the sensitization process.
- The NSCDC should be further empowered to support the sensitization efforts at the community level. Provision of vehicles for supervisors to monitor field staff and provision of PPE items as well.
- Alternative means of communication like the use of Sat Phones should be procured and given to field staff. Although Rivers has an effective communication system, alternative ones should be in place to ensure a smooth uninterrupted process.
- Extra data sources should be provided for field staff that may require transmission of data while in the field. Having more than one internet network is an avenue.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Communication	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

5. PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR MANAGING RISKS.

5.1. Training

- Staff and security agency **induction training on SOPs and ERPs** regularly organised by the State Security Manager should be a requirement for field work. This is the same as in item 5 above.
- All programme and security agency personnel to be briefed on the delivery framework and RoE
- Vaccination team training and rehearsals.

5.2. Drills

- Background vetting process should be setup for all recruitment exercise. The State Security Manager should be involved in this process.
- Covid-19 site protocol.

5.3. Equipment

- A dedicated transport fleet should be created with vehicles suitable for field work.
- Vehicle trackers should be installed on all project vehicles.
- A robust IT system and plan for data capture.
- A Robust cold chain containers with appropriate time specifications for temperature retention.
- PPE provision (sanitisation, masks, disinfectants, signage).
- Staff ID badges
- Dual SIM phones.
- Sat phones.

5.4. Communication

- WhatsApp Alert groups should be formed where security information can be disseminated to staff quickly. This can be managed by the State Security Manager
- 'Constant Companion Card' this is a contacts card with relevant project contacts that all staff should have.
- A Rules of Engagement Card (RoE) should be made available to security personnel.


5.5. Security Advisory Unit

- Set up a Security Advisory Team in Abuja, to be led at state level by a State Security Manager that will oversee all security issues that include Travel Security, Security Training, and lead crisis response. He will be a member of the COVID-19 Security Group and will ensure cross cooperation between the different security groups like the Police, Civil Defence, Military, Road Safety, DSS, Navy and Air force. He will also coordinate relationship with local community stakeholders.
- Security Hotline that will be owned by the State Security Manager that is active 24 hours a day. This hotline will be different from the COVID-19 response line.
- Creating a Crisis Management Team consisting of mid-rank representatives the deferent security groups. This team will ensure compliance of their personnel to Project guidelines stated in the ESS 4 of the World Bank ESF and other procedures.

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- A COVID-19 Adverse Reaction Unit should also be formed, or existing units repurposed to respond people who experience adverse reaction to the vaccine. This unit should have representatives at every ward in each local government, so people do not need to pay for adverse reaction to the vaccine.

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6. SUMMARY OF SECURITY FINDINGS.



	Threat Scenario	Impact	Probability	Risk
1	Terrorism	3 Moderate	1 Unlikely	Low
2	Crime	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
3	Civil Unrest	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
4	Travel risk	3 Moderate	2 Possible	Low
5	Kidnap	3 Moderate	2 Possible	Low
6	Medical Emergency	3 Moderate	2.5 Possible	Low
7	Fire Event	2 Minor	1 Unlikely	Negligible
8	Environmental (Weather)	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
9	Programmatic	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
10	Deployment	2 Minor	3.5 Likely	Low
11	Political	3.5 Moderate	2.5 Possible	Low
12	Corruption	2.5 Minor	3 Likely	Low
13	Communication	3.5 Moderate	2 Possible	Low

The above risk maps are a means of demonstrating the intended reduction in risk, using the proposed controls. The intention is to be able to use these controls to build the Security Management Plan, Emergency Response Plans and the appropriate staff and security training regimen and to accept the residual level of risk left in place. These controls do not guarantee such incidents will not happen, but they reduce the chances of one happening. If one occurs, the impact is minimised, and the chances of recovery are maximised.

The above controls can be grouped into the following broad categories, which will become the basic components of the security management framework:

Security procedures, training standards and contingency plans are key parts of the overall security management. An integrated security solution using people, technology and procedures involves all three

aspects, and each must be carefully coordinated with the other two to produce a seamless security environment.

This risk assessment identifies the priority risks and provides a framework against which we identify the current security shortfalls and prioritise the recommended work to mitigate the gaps.

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